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I. INTRODUCTION

InDavisv. UnitedStates' the Supreme Court decided that the standard
to be used in determining whether a criminal suspect invoked the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel in a police interrogation was threshold of
* To my family, Tommy, Shelby and Tom, for their love and support, and to my fiance6,
Shane, for everything.
1. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
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clarity.2 Prior to Davis, police officers' and courts' treatment of equivocal
and ambiguous counsel requests varied among the districts. 3 Lower courts
applied three standards-threshold of clarity, clarification, and per se
invocation.' The Supreme Court of Florida extended the application of the
threshold of clarity standard in State v. Owen,5 holding that the standard
applied not only to invoking the right to counsel, but also to invoking the
right to remain silent.6
The threshold of clarity standard favors direct and assertive individuals
at the expense of indirect and powerless individuals, often women.7
Linguistic studies show that women speak in a different register than men,'
making it less likely that police officers will perceive their statements as
unequivocal and unambiguous requests to remain silent or obtain an
attorney.9 The gender bias inherent in this standard jeopardizes the
constitutional rights of the more than two million women arrested each
year. 10
This Note recommends analyzing the threshold of clarity standard
through feminist legal methods to reveal the gender bias in a seemingly
gender-neutral legal doctrine." Courts should interpret their state
constitutions as providing more protection than the threshold of clarity
standard affords and adopt the per se invocation standard. The per se
invocation standard eliminates gender discrimination and is a bright-line test
that would be easy for police officers and courts to apply.

2. See id. at 461 (holding that "after a knowing and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights,

[questioning may continue] until and unless the suspect clearlyrequests an attorney") (emphasis
added).
3. See id. at 455.

4. See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 96 n.3 (1984). The per se invocation standard
requires "that all questioning must cease upon any request for or reference to counsel." Id. The
clarification standard "define[s] a threshold standard of clarity for requests," which "trigger the

right to counsel." Id. The clarification standard requires the termination of interrogation when "an
accused makes an equivocal statement that 'arguably' can be construed as a request for counsel."
Id. The clarification standard permits 'narrow questions designed to 'clarify' the earlier statement
and the accused's desires respecting counsel." Id.
5. 696 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1997).
6. See id. at 717-18.
7. See Janet E. Ainsworth, In a DifferentRegister: The PragmaticsofPowerlessness in
Police Interrogation,103 YALE L.J. 259, 261-62 (1993).
8. See id. at 274.
9. See id. at 290.
10. In 1995, 2,332,213 women were arrested in the United States. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOKOFCRIMINALJUSTICESTATISTICS: 1996, at 380
tbl.4.8 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore, eds., 1997).
11. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, FeministLegalMethods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829,
829 (1990) ("identiffying] and critically examin[ing] ... feminist legal methods").
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II. GENDER BASED LANGUAGE DIFFERENCES

A. "Women's Language"
Variations in male and female speech arose from, and help perpetuate,
male dominance and inequality in all aspects of society.12 A linguistics
researcher developed the term "women's language" to describe the dialect
that society teaches women to speak. 3 "Women's language" leaves the
speaker unable to express herself strongly and injects uncertainty where it
may not belong. 4 Women using this type of speech seem less confident
than those using male dialects.' 5
Others suggest that the claim that men and women have different
languages is an overstatement, but rather certain speech characteristics are
gender-linked.' 6 Certain situations increase the speech differences, which
together form a register, especially when a power gap exists between the
speaker and listener. 7 Women's language has been characterized as an
arsenal "of speech strategies that women [and other] subordinated
speakers[,] have [developed] to [handle] encounters with more powerful
[individuals.]"'"
B. Elements of the Female Register
One characteristic that women use more frequently in conversation than
men is the tag-question. 9 Tag questions, something between a question and
a statement, are formed to evoke a response from the listener.2" Speakers
can use a tag-question when they want to make a declarative claim, but are
uncertain of its accuracy." For example: "'I should see a lawyer, shouldn't

12. See Barrie Thome & Nancy Henley, Difference and Dominance: An Overview of
Language, Gender, and Society, in LANGUAGE AND SEX: DIFFERENCE AND DOMINANCE 5, 15
(Barrie Thorne & Nancy Henley, eds., 1975).

13. See ROBIN LAKOFF,

LANGUAGE AND WOMAN'S PLACE 6-7 (1975).
14. See id. at 7.
15. See id. at 17.
16. Ainsworth, supra note 7, at 272-73.
17. See id. at 274.
18. Lucie E. White, Subordination,RhetoricalSurvivalSkills, andSundayShoes:Notes on
the HearingofMrs. G. [1990], in FEMINISTLEGALTHEORY:READINGS INLAW AND GENDER 404,
406 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy, eds., 1991).
19. LAKOFF, supranote 13, at 14. A tag-question is a statement with a question attached to
the end, for instance, "John is here, isn't he?". See id. at 15.
20. Janet Holmes, "Women's Language": A FunctionalApproach, 24 GEN. LINGUISTICS
149, 152 (1984).
21. LAKOFF, supranote 13, at 15.
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IT"' However, that structure can also soften the commanding sound of an
indirect request.'
Another characteristic is the hedge, which reduces the force of a
statement.24 Hedges-words like "kind of;" "well," "maybe," and "sort
of'-convey uncertainty, even though the speaker knows the assertion is
true.2 Those hedges, along with "I think" or "I guess" at the beginning of
sentences, are likely to appear when speakers are in a situation where they
lack confidence.26
A third characteristic is using modal verbs such as "could," "should,"
"may," and "might."'2 7 These verbs counter the matter-of-fact quality of a
declaration by softening the emphasis.2" A fourth characteristic is
substituting interrogative forms for imperatives. 9 Speakers convert
commands to requests because commands demand compliance while
requests leave the decision to the addressee.3 ° Polite qualifiers further
weaken the assertiveness of statements. For example: "Ifyou don't mind,
could you call me a lawyer?" instead of "Call my lawyer."'" The final
gender-linked trait is using rising intonation in declaratives that are not

22. Ainsworth, supra note 7, at 278.
23. Holmes, supranote 20, at 153. Holmes analyzed male and female uses of tag questions
finding that both used tags, but for different reason. Id. at 154-55 & tbl.1. Women normally used
tags to express politeness, facilitate conversation, and soften demands, whereas men were more
likely to use tags to express uncertainty. Id. This suggests a problem in police interrogations, since
male officers may misunderstand a woman's tag as a sign of uncertainty, and, therefore, not an
unequivocal and unambiguous request for counsel or to remain silent. The woman may only be
using the tag to soften her command for counsel.
24. Id. at 152. Hedges have a legitimate use when a speaker wants "to express 'genuine'
uncertainty." Id. at 156. Hedges serving the uncertainty function are probably used equally by men
and women. See id.Researchers are concerned with "unjustifiable or 'illegitimate' hedges" where
the speaker knows the assertion is true, but is "apolog[izing ] for making an assertion at all." Id.
25. See LAKOFF, supra note 13, at 53; Marjorie Swacker, The Sex of the Speaker as a
SociolinguisticVariable, in LANGUAGE AND SEX: DIFFERENCE AND DOMINANCE, supra note 12, at
76, 79-82 (describing a linguistic study that asked men and women to describe a picture; and
finding that women preceded half of their numbers with words of approximation like "about,"
"around," and "or," whereas, only one male used an estimation).
26. See LAKoFF, supranote 13, at 54. Lakoff suggests that women use hedges because they
fear being too assertive and direct. See id. Hedges are a protection mechanism since they allow
the speaker to distance herself from a statement that others may disagree with or may later be
proved inaccurate. See id.
27. See Ainsworth, supranote 7, at 280.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 281.
30. See LAKoFF, supra note 13, at 18. According to Lakoff, "[a]n overt order (as in an
imperative) expresses the (often impolite) assumption of the speaker's superior position to the
addressee, carrying with it the right to enforce compliance." Id.
31. Ainsworth, supranote 7, at 281. Women are socialized from childhood to avoid making
direct commands because it is considered "unfeminine." Id.
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intended to express uncertainty.32 The statements sound hesitant because
they have the form of declarations, but they have the inflection of yes-no
questions. 3 The combination of the gender elements suggests that
"women's speech is devised to prevent the expression of strong
statements. 34
C. Effect of Context
Female register elements can emerge in the speech of any group lacking
"real-world power. 31 5 Social status is a variable, in addition to gender,
which correlates with the use of female register features.36 Women with a
high social status--"well-educated, professional, [with a] middle class
background"-are less likely to exhibit characteristics of the register."
Individuals with a lower socioeconomic status, the people most frequently
subjected to police interrogation, are more likely to use the female
register.3"
The social context of communication influences the frequency at which
these characteristics appear. 9 Relevant factors include: being in public, the
formalness of the situation, the "role of the speaker," and the "power of the
speaker [compared to that of] the addressee."4 ° People who perceive
themselves as powerless and "in 'no-win' situations" respond by adopting
equivocal speech patterns. 4 For example, women's language characteristics
appear more often when people address police officers, than when police

32. See id. at 282. Compare "I need a lawyer," to "I need a lawyer?" Id.
33. See LAKOFF, supranote 13, at 16-17; Ruth M. Brend, Male-FemaleIntonation Patterns
in AmericanEnglish, in LANGUAGE AND SEX: DIFFERENCE AND DOMINANCE, supra note 12, at 84,
84-86 (finding that men end statements in the lowest possible pitch and reserve final rising
intonations for questions, while women frequently vary their pitch and often sound as if they are
requesting confirmation).
34. LAKOFF, supranote 13, at 19.
35. See Holmes, supra note 20, at 157. This note only addresses the gender bias in the
threshold of clarity standard; however, the same language differences also reveal a cultural bias
in the standard.
36. See wauM M. O'BARR, LINGtUSTIC EVIDENCE: LANGUAGE, POwER, AND STRATEGY
IN THE COURTROOM 69 (1982). O'Barr suggests the speech phenomenon first observed byLakoff
should be renamed'"powerless language" because he found the pattermwas primarily due to social
status not gender. See id. at 70. Women have a greater tendency to use these patterns because they
are more likely to hold relatively powerless social positions. See id. at 70-71.
37. See id. at 69. O'Barr examined taped courtroom testimony from male and female
witnesses. See id. at 71. O'Barr found witnesses with a low social status used elements of the
women's language/female register most often. See id. at 69-70.
38. See Ainsworth, supranote 7, at 286.
39. See Holmes, supranote 20, at 157.
40. Id.
41. Ainsworth, supra note 7, at 284-85.
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officers address people.42 The powerless avoid speaking directly because
they fear taking responsibility for statements and possible responses from
the addressee, but by evading one danger they risk another since
indirectness can be misunderstood.43 Typically, men speak the language of
the powerful-direct and clear.'
The female register may not be evident when a person is at ease in a
familiar setting; however, "when [a] situation is stressful [and] much
depends on the outcome," the speech pattern is "likely to affect
communication."45 The listener may draw incorrect conclusions about the
person's intentions because listeners interpret speech "according to their
own conventions. 46 The greater the power imbalance between speaker and
addressee, "the more likely the powerless speaker" will use elements of the
female register.47 The police interrogation context embodies a high degree
of power disparity, since the officer controls the situation and the suspect
is in an intimidating and unfamiliar environment.48
Police are trained to make suspects in interrogations, which are
inherently fraught with coercion and anxiety, feel even more threatened.
Tactics include: maintaining privacy during the questioning, ° using
formalities to heighten apprehension, 5 ' close seating arrangements, 2 using

42. See Holmes, supranote 20, at 157.
43. See ROBIN TOLMACH LAKOFF, TALKING PowER: THE PoLincs OF LANGUAGE IN OUR
LIvEs 32 (1990). The powerful speak in direct terms because they do not fear being perceived as
rude or found incorrect in their assertions. See id. Even if their language is ambiguous, society is
willing to make greater efforts to interpret the powerful's statements. See id. at 32-33.
44. See id. at 205. According to Lakoff, men's language is:
expected of those who need not fear giving offense, who need not worry about the
risks of responsibility.... Women's language developed as a way of surviving
and even flourishing without control over economic, physical, or social reality.
Then it is necessary to listen more than speak, agree more than confront, be
delicate, be indirect, say dangerous things in such a way that their impact will be
felt after the speaker is out of range of the hearer's retaliation.
Id.
45. John J. Gumperz & Jenny Cook-Gumperz, Introduction: Language and the
Communication ofSocial Identiy, in LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL IDENTTrY 1, 18 (John J. Gumperz
ed., 1982).
46. Id.
47. Ainsworth, supranote 7, at 285.
48. See id. at 287 (stating that police interrogations "may be the paradigmatic context in
which one participant ... feels powerless before the other").
49. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448-55 (1966) (describing the "third degree").
50. See FRED E. INBAU ETAL.,CR&iNALOTRRoGATIONAND CONFESSIONS 24 (3d ed. 1986);
Miranda,384 U.S. at 449.
51. See INBAU ET AL., supra note 50, at 37.
52. See id. (recommending 4 or 5 feet).
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accusatory confrontations,5" trickery and deception,54 and taking up to four
hours for an interview.55 The officer's complete control ofthe conversation

combined with the physical power over the suspect leads to a feeling of
powerlessness much greater than that found in ordinary life.56
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Miranda v. Arizona andFifthAmendment Rights
Since Miranda v. Arizona,"7 officers have had to follow procedural
safeguards to ensure that an individual's Fifth Amendment58 right against
self-incrimination is protected in all custodial police interrogations.59 Before
initiating questioning, the officer must advise the suspect that "[s]he has a
right to remain silent," that any of her statements can be used against her
in court, and that she has the right to have an attorney, retained or
appointed, present." The MirandaCourt found a right to counsel during
custodial questioning, distinct from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
implied in the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 6' Since
custodial questioning is inherently coercive, the atmosphere and the police
officers will likely induce unrepresented suspects into confessing during the
interrogation.62 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches
automatically once the system initiates adversarial proceedings against the
accused.63 However, the different origin of the Miranda right to counsel
requires, unlike the Sixth Amendment right, that an individual invoke the
Fifth Amendment right affirmatively." 4
For a prosecutor to use a suspect's statements, the individual must

53. See id.at 91.
54. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 453.
55. See INBAU ET AL., supra note 50, at 310.
56. See Ainsworth, supra note 7, at 288.
57. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
58. The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part, "[n]o person... shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself" U.S. CONST. amend. V.
59. The Court defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way." See Miranda,384 U.S. at 444.

60. Id.
61. See id.; McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176-79 (1991) (discussing the difference
between the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the Miranda Fifth Amendment right to
counsel).
62. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 455-56.
63. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984).
64. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458-62 (reviewing the history of the right against selfincrimination).
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voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive her constitutional rights.65
If the individual "indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process"
that she does not want to be interrogated or she wants to speak with an
attorney, then all questioning must cease." An individual can cut off
questioning and invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege, even though she
initially waived her rights.67
The warnings are necessary to counter the inherently coercive policedominated atmosphere where officers isolate suspects in unfamiliar
surroundings.68 Through tactics such as trickery, persistence, and exuding
confidence in the suspect's guilt, officers leave individuals little choice but
to confirm the police officers' preconceived version of events.69 The
pressures of the environment can easily erase the initial security that the
warnings provide, however, making the right to have counsel present
crucial in protecting the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.7"
B. Edwards v. Arizona and the Bright-LineRule
Problems arose in the application ofMiranda.Officers and courts were
unsure when questioning could resume after an individual asserted her Fifth
Amendment right to counsel. The Supreme Court has distinguished
between asserting the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. 7' When
a suspect invokes the right to remain silent, the police officer must stop the
interrogation, but can continue the questioning after a short period if the
officer reads the suspect the Miranda rights again.' Suspects receive
greater protection if they assert the Fifth Amendment right to counsel
because police interrogation is more restricted.73
In Edwards v. Arizona74 the Court held that once a suspect effectively

65. See id. at 476. The Court developed the knowing and intelligent standard for waiving
constitutional rights in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Waivers must be the product of
free and deliberate choice, not intimidation, coercion or deception. SeeMiranda,384 U.S. at 457.

In addition to being voluntary, a waiver must be made with a "full awareness" of the nature of the
right and the consequences of abandoning that right. See Moram v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421
(1986).
66. Miranda,384 U.S. at 444-45; Ainsworth, supranote 7, at 294-95.
67. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 473-74.
68. See id. at 448-50.
69. See id. at455.

70. Seeid. at469.
71. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 109-10 (1975) (White, J., concurring); Ainsworth,
supranote 7, at 295.
72. See Ainsworth, supranote 7, at 295-96.
73. See id. at 296.
74. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). After Edwards' arrest for robbery, burglary, and first-degree
murder, he was taken to the police station and read his Miranda rights. Id. at 478. Edwards

claimed he understood his rights and would answer the police officer's questions. Id. The police
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invoked the right to counsel, police could not reinitiate an interrogation
until counsel was made available.75 The Edwards rule protects suspects
from police badgering intended to induce a waiver of "previously asserted
Mirandarights."'7 6 The prohibition on questioning continues until counsel
is present, regardless of consultations with an attorney outside the
interrogation room." Edwards answered some of the uncertainties
surrounding the application of Miranda,making the protections easy to
implement.78 The Court created a bright-line rule for law enforcement
professionals to follow-no exchanges with a suspect who has invoked her
Fifth Amendment rights.79
C. Davis v. United States: Threshold of Clarity
Before the Edwards prohibition on further questioning can apply, an
individual must request the assistance of counsel.8" Conflict quickly arose
regarding the requirements for an effective request,8 ' splitting courts among
officer told Edwards another suspect already implicated Edwards in the crime, which prompted
Edwards to make a taped denial. Id. at 479. Then Edwards wanted to "make a deal." Id. The
police officer responded by telling Edwards he wanted a statement and giving him the telephone
number of an attorney since he was not authorized to make a deal. Id. After Edwards called the
attorney he said, "I want an attorney before making a deal." Id. The next morning two of the
interrogating officer's colleagues came to the jail to question Edwards, even though he had
invoked his right to counsel. Id. Edwards responded that he did not want to talk to anyone, but
"[t]he guard told him that'he had' to talk" to the officers. Id. Edwards listened to his accomplice's
taped statement and said, "I'll tell you anything you want to know, but I don't want it on tape."
Id. Edwards then made incriminating statements. Id.
75. See id. at 484-85. Further communication can occur only once an attorney is present or
the suspect initiates conversations with the police. See id.
76. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990).
77. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990).
78. But see Edwards,451 U.S. at 489-90 (Powell, J., concurring in the result) (stating that
the majority opinion is "unclear").
79. See id.at486. Simply responding to police-initiated conversation after invoking the Fifth
Amendment protection is not enough for a valid waiver. See id. at 485-86. The requirements to
establish a waiver are clearer afterEdwards;the accused must initiate conversation relevant to the
crime being investigated and meet the Johnsonv. Zerbstknowing and intelligent waiver standard.
See id. at 485, 486 n.9.
80. See id. at 484-85.
81. See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 n.3 (1984). Two police officers questioned Smith
as follows:
Q ...
You have a right to remain silent. You do not have to talk to me unless
you want to do so. Do you understand that?
A. Uh.She told me to get my lawyer. She said you guys would railroad me.
Q. If you do want to talk to me I must advise you that whatever you say can and
will be used against you in court. Do you understand that?
A. Yeah.
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three approaches. The per se invocation standard demanded that any
reference to counsel, despite ambiguity in the request, terminate
questioning.82 The clarification standard required that interrogation stop if
an equivocal statement could be considered a request, except for narrow
questions to clarify whether the accused was requesting the presence of
counsel.83 The third standard, threshold of clarity, attempted to establish a
threshold standard for effective requests: requests which fell below the
threshold did not trigger the right to counsel.84
The Davis Court held that the correct standard to be used is threshold
of clarity, and questioning stops only if the individual actually requests an
attorney.85 Officers do not have to clarify an ambiguous request, but can

Q. You have a right to consult with a lawyer and to have a lawyer present with
you when you're being questioned. Do you understand that?
A. Uh, yeah. I'd like to do that.
Q. Okay.

Q.

If you want a lawyer and you're unable to pay for one a lawyer will be
appointed to represent you free of cost, do you understand that?
A. Okay.
Q. Do you wish to talk to me at this time without a lawyer being present?
A. Yeah and no, uh, I don't know what's what, really.
Q. Well. You either have [to agree] to talk to me this time without a lawyer
being present and if you do agree to talk with me without a lawyer being present
you can stop at any time you want to.
A. All right. I'll talk to you then.
Id. at 92-93 (footnote & citations omitted).
82. See id. at 95 n.3. For cases supporting the per se invocation standard see UnitedStates
v. Porter,764 F.2d 1, 6 (lst Cir. 1985); Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202, 205 (6th Cir. 1978);
People v. Cerezo, 635 P.2d 197,199-200 (Colo. 1981);Peoplev. SuperiorCourt,542 P.2d 1390,
1395 (Cal. 1975).
83. See Smith, 469 U.S. at 95 n.3.
84. Id. For cases where courts applied the threshold of clarity standard and held that
defendant's requests failed to invoke the Fifth Amendment right to counsel see State v. Campbell,
367 N.W. 2d 454, 459 (Minn. 1985) ("'[]fI'm going to be charged with murder maybe I should
talk to an attorney."'); State v. Moorman, 744 P.2d 679, 685 (Ariz. 1987) (."I wonder if I need
an attorney."'); Bunch v. Commonwealth, 304 S.E. 2d 271,275 (Va. 1983) (Individual stated "he
felt like he might want to talk to a lawyer.").
85. See Davis, 512 U.S. 461. The Naval Investigation Service questioned Davis, a member
of the Navy, after connecting him to a murder at a club over an unpaid pool wager. See id. at 454.
The interviewing agents advised Davis that he was a murder suspect and had the right to remain
silent and to counsel and then Davis waived both rights. See id. at 454-55. After an hour and a half
of questioning, Davis said, "'Maybe I should talk to a lawyer."' Id. at 455. The agents told Davis
they were not going to continue the questioning unless they clarified if Davis was asking for
counsel or making a comment. See id.Davis responded, "'No, I'm not asking for a lawyer,... No,
I don't want a lawyer."' Id. After another hour of questioning Davis said, "'I think I want a lawyer
before I say anything else,"' and then the agents stopped the interview. Id.
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ignore the individual's statement and continue the questioning. 6 The
Edwards protection must be affirmatively invoked by a statement that a
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would find to be an
unambiguous request for counsel.8 7
The Court acknowledged that the threshold of clarity standard will be
detrimental to suspects who want a lawyer present, but because of "fear,
intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons" will be
unable to assert their desire for counsel clearly.88 In spite of this, the Court
reasoned that the threshold standard was needed to maintain the easy
application of the Edwards rule since that ease would be lost if police
officers had to stop questioning after an ambiguous counsel request.8 9
According to the Court, a suspect's primary protection is the Miranda
warnings and a voluntary, knowing waiver is enough to suggest that the
suspect will talk to the police without a lawyer.9 '
The Davis decision disregards the Fifth Amendment rights of the timid
and those who poorly express their request for counsel.92 The Miranda
purpose-alleviating the inherently coercive custodial interrogation
atmosphere-is subverted.93 Suspects who think they have asserted their
right to counsel will see their requests ignored and may, perceiving further
objections as futile, confess, regardless of their guilt, to end the
confrontation. 94
IV. FLORIDA'S APPROACH
A. ClarifyingEquivocal Requests: Owen v. State
Since 1997, Florida police must end custodial questioning only if the
suspect unequivocally invokes the right to remain silent or the right to

86. See id. at 461.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 460.
89. Seeid. at461.

90. See id. at 460.
91. Seeid. at461.
92. See id. at 469-72 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgement). Justice Souter, who was
joined by three other justices, maintained that Miranda required the Court to adopt the
clarification standard, which would give police officers a legal obligation to respond to ambiguous

counsel requests with narrow questions designed to verify whether the suspect is asking for
counsel. See id. at 476 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
93. See id. at 471-73 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).

94. See id. at 472-73. (Souter, 3., concurring in the judgement) (citing Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478,481-86 (1964) (finding Escobedo's confession resulted from his "sense ofdilenma"
which escalated after his requests to talk to an attorney were denied)).
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counsel." The Supreme Court ofFlorida originally decided Owen v. State96
in 1990. Police officers obtained confessions for burglary, sexual battery,
and first degree murder from Owen during the interrogation.97 The police
officers persuaded Owen to confess by presenting their evidence and telling
Owen that they already had enough proof to convict him.9" During the
interrogation, Owen replied to a question with "I'd rather not talk about
it."'99 The police officers did not clarify whether Owen was invoking either
his right to remain silent or requesting counsel, but instead continued urging
Owen to respond."° In the process, the police officers disregarded another
attempt Owen made to assert his rights---"I don't want to talk about it.'' 11
The Supreme Court of Florida reversed Owen's conviction finding "[t]he
responses were, at the least, an equivocal invocation of theMirandaright
to terminate questioning, which could only be clarified." 2
B. The Change After Davis: State v. Owen
1. The Majority Opinion
Before Owen's retrial, the Supreme Court of Florida reconsidered the
case in light ofDavis v. UnitedStates.03 The court held that the threshold
of clarity standard was sufficient to protect an individual's Fifth
Amendment right and neither the federal nor the Florida Constitution
required clarifying questions." The court explained that past decisions
were based on their understanding of the federal law, after Edwards v.
Arizona but before Davis, which seemingly required police officers to end
an interrogation or clarify a suspect's desire after an equivocal invocation
ofMirandarights.'
Although Davis involved a suspect's request for counsel, the court
applied the same rule to Owen's equivocal assertion of his right to remain
silent. 0 6 The court reasoned that the Davis concern of creating a bright line
rule that police could easily apply without unduly hampering their

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715, 719 (Fla. 1997).
560 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1990).
Seeid. at209-10.
See id. at 210.
Id. at211.
See id.

101. Id.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
See Owen, 696 So. 2d at 717.
See id. at 720.
See id. at 717.
See id. at 717-18.
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investigation applied in both contexts." 7 According to the court, the ease
of application would be sacrificed if officers had to make judgment calls
about whether a suspect invoked her Fifth Amendment rights." 8 If police
are not certain of the suspect's intentions they are not required to stop the
questioning or even ask questions to clarify the request because it "places
'1 9
too great an impediment upon society's interest in thwarting crime. 0
2. Justice Shaw's Concurrence
In a concurring opinion, Justice Shaw considered language differences,
however, among ethnic communities rather than between the genders."0
Justice Shaw emphasized the need to explain the meaning of "clearly
invoke" to ensure the standard is not "used as a 'one glove fits all'
criterion.""' Florida courts should recognize the state's diverse population
and use a "reasonable person" standard that accounts for ethnic
background, the suspect's education, and English fluency."' All suspects
cannot invoke their constitutional rights with the same degree of directness
and clarity." 3
3. Chief Justice Kogan's Dissent
Chief Justice Kogan criticized both Davis and the majority for placing
a hurdle-the "demand of heightened linguistic care"-in front of criminal
suspects, the group least able to surmount it." 4 Rather than being a brightline rule as the majority claimed, the threshold of clarity standard requires
police officers to judge when a suspect's invocation is clear."' The court
failed in balancing the accused's Fifth Amendment rights with law
enforcement interests in thwarting crime because the threshold of clarity
standard benefits law enforcement while discriminating against the
accused." 6 Chief Justice Kogan disapproved of the standard because
suspects who are unable to assert themselves clearly because of "physical
condition, level of intimidation, level of fear, or lack of linguistic ability"
will lose theMirandaprotection." 7 Since the Florida Constitution gives the
107. See id. at 718.
108. See id. at 719.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 721-22 (Shaw, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 722 (Shaw, J., concurring).
112. Id. (Shaw, J., concurring).
113. See id. (Shaw, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 724 (Kogan, C. J.,
dissenting) (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 469-70 (Souter, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
115. See id. at 723 (Kogan, C. J.,
dissenting).
116. See id. at 724 (Kogan, C. J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 723 (Kogan, C. J., dissenting).
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court the authority to vary from federal law, Justice Kogan would have
reaffirmed Owen despite the Davis decision."' The Florida Constitution
allows the court, even if the United States Constitution does not, to
continue their prior approach and hold that "clarification" is the correct
standard.' 19
C. The FloridaConstitution
Before State v. Owen, courts found that the Florida Constitution would
not allow officers to ignore a suspect's equivocal request for counsel or to
remain silent. 20 In Kipp v. State, now overruled pursuant to the Owen
decision, 2 ' the Second District Court of Appeal held that the Florida
Constitution required officers to end questioning, except to clarify the
suspect's wishes, after an equivocal invocation of the right to remain
silent.'22 Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution is comparable to the
United States Constitution's Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. Article I, section 9 provides that "[n]o person shall... be
compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against himself.'" The
Fifth District Court of Appeal held in Deck v. State that under the Florida
Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Florida in Traylor v.
State, 24 individuals who ambiguously invoke their right to remain silent
receive the same protection as those who make direct requests.'25
The Traylor court found that section 9 required interrogation to
immediately stop if a suspect "indicates in any manner" that she does not
want to be questioned. 2 6 In Owen, the Supreme Court of Florida reexamined the Traylor decision and explained that it "added nothing to
federal law" and was not intended to decide appropriate police responses
to ambiguous requests.'27 The "in any manner" language meant only that
there was no magic formula for invoking the right to remain silent.'28 The
court did reaffirm that the Florida Constitution has primacy over the federal
constitution, which establishes only the minimum constitutional protection
118. See id. at 725 (Kogan, C. J., dissenting).
119. See id. (Kogan, C. J., dissenting).
120. See Kipp v. State, 668 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Deck v. State, 653 So. 2d 435
(Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
121. SeeKipp v. State, 703 So. 2d 1121, 1121 (Fla. 2dDCA 1997).
122. See Kipp, 668 So. 2d at 215.
123. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 9.
124. 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992).
125. See Deck, 653 So. 2d at 436-37. Mr. Deck's statement to the Agent during the
interrogation was, "'I can't talk about it anymore."' Id. at 436. The Agent did not inquire as to

whether Mr. Deck was asserting his right to remain silent. See id.
126. Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 966.
127. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 719.
128. See id.
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required.129 Therefore, the court was free to hold that the Florida
Constitution mandated a higher standard than threshold of clarity.
V. THE NEED FOR FEMINIST LEGAL METHODS
A. Gender Bias in the CriminalJustice System
The Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission found
gender bias in nearly every aspect of the Florida legal system. 130 Gender
differences in confession rates is a relatively unexplored area of law,13 ' and
the legal community is not addressing the discriminatory effect the
threshold of clarity doctrine has on women. Not only does the standard
make it more likely that women will confess, but convictions may have
harsher consequences for women. The justice system usually punishes
women more severely than men who commit the same crime.1 32 The
different treatment results from a lack of facilities which causes minimum
security offenders to serve their time at facilities designed for maximum
security prisoners; the "shortage of rehabilitation programs for women[;]"
facilities which makes women more likely to
and less crowded women's
133
serve full sentences.
While there are no American studies which examine the role of gender
in police interrogations,134 one limited analysis found a trend indicating that
women were more likely to confess. 13' The lack of studies results from the
legal community using traditional "masculine" jurisprudence rather than
feminist jurisprudence. Legal theory does not reflect women's values or
lives "because legal theory.., is about actual, real life, enacted, legislated,
adjudicated law, and women have, from law's inception, lacked the power
36
to make law protect, value, or seriously regard our experience."'
Traditional jurisprudence ignores women because our laws, which are

129. See id.

130. Robert Craig Waters, GenderBiasin Florida'sJusticeSystem, FLA. B.J., May 1990, at
10.
131. See Paul G.Cassell & Bret S. Hayman,PoliceInterrogationin the 1990s: An Empirical

Study ofthe Effects ofMiranda, 43 UCLA L. REv. 839, 899 (1996).
132. See Waters, supra note 130, at 12.
133. Id.
134. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 131, at 899. One British study found that during
police interrogations men were over three times as likely as women to "exercise silence." Id. at
899 n.285. However, the small sample size meant the results were not statistically significant. See
id.
135. See id. at 899-900. Since the sample consisted of a small number of women, the results
were statistically insignificant. See id.at 900.
136. Robin WestJurisprudenceandGender[19881, in FEMINISTLEGALTHEORY, supranote
18, at 201, 231.
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written by men, are intended to protect men. 137 Feminist legal theory
13
attempts to uncover male norms which are incorporated into the law. 1
Before legal doctrines can be shaped to fit men's and women's lives,
lawmakers must take women's lives seriously and stop presupposing
that
39
traditional male life patterns and characteristics apply to all people.
B. The Woman Question
Feminist legal methods are used to critically analyze the law and reveal
aspects of an issue that the traditional approaches overlook. 4 ' The method
attempts to rectify women's "outsider" status in society by creating
alternative legal conventions that take women's experiences and needs into
account.' 4' The importance that the courts have placed on establishing a
fixed rule for invoking the Edwards protection 142 reflects the emphasis
traditional legal methods place on certainty and predictability. 3
One feminist legal method tool asks "the woman question," which
reveals gender implications of rules that appear neutral. 44 The woman
question asks whether legal doctrines consider women, how legal standards
disadvantage women, and how to correct the omission. 45 The tool analyzes
issues beyond the face of a law in order to expose the law's effect and then
recommends rules that do not overlook and oppress women. 146 A

137. See id.
138. See Ainsworth, supra note 7, at 316 n.310.
139. See Joan C. Williams, DeconstructingGender, (1989) in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY,
supra note 18, at 95, 106 (offering a challenge to the "desirability of men's traditional life
patterns").
140. See Bartlett, supranote 11, at 829.
141. Id. at 831.
142. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994); State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715,
718 (Fla. 1997).
143. See Bartlett, supra note 11, at 832.
144. Id. at 837.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 843. Women used the woman question to challenge the Supreme Court's
ruling on California's state employee disability plan which singled out pregnancy as virtually the
only medical condition not covered. See id. at 841. The Supreme Court ignored the connection
between gender and pregnancy, claiming the "program divides potential recipients into two
groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons." Id. (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484,497 n.20 (1974)). The first group is comprised of only women; however, "the second includes
members of both sexes." Id. (quoting Geduldig,417U.S.at497 n.20). The exclusion of"pregnant
persons" was not sex discrimination because both sexes are in the "nonpregnant persons" group
who receive benefits. See id.
Women made Congress acknowledge the connection between gender and pregnancy in The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act by asking "woman questions" including: "Do exclusions based on
pregnancy disadvantage women?... What are the reasons for *singling out pregnancy for
exclusion?... Are other disabilities costly? ...Are other covered disabilities voluntary?... Are
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systematic method is needed because without conscious effort, lawmakers
will be unable to recognize and combat an oppression they have not
experienced.' 47
C. Recommendation-PerSe Invocation
The Supreme Court of Florida failed to consider the effect that the
threshold of clarity standard has on women. Justice Shaw's analysis moves
in the right direction, but language differences extend beyond the obvious
ethnic dialects. The court chose the threshold of clarity standard because
other standards placed too great of a hindrance on law enforcement's
criminal investigations; 4 8 however, the court overlooked the threshold of
clarity's great burden on individual constitutional rights. It is not enough to
use a reasonable person standard, as Justice Shaw suggests, in deciding
whether an invocation is clear because that only guides the courts, not the
police officers who are making the decision daily. The per se standard
provides a better balance between individual liberties and state law
enforcement interests.
Per se invocation construes all ambiguous statements, from which a
request for counsel or to remain silent can be reasonably inferred, as
effective invocations of Fifth Amendment rights.' 49 Applying the per se
invocation standard, courts would give legal effect to requests using hedges
or modal verbs like "maybe," "I think," or "could."' 50 The standard also
acknowledges requests phrased as tag questions, interrogatives used as
polite imperatives, and declarations with rising intonations as effective
invocations.'
Threshold of clarity allows police to ignore all these
52
forms.1

The Miranda and Traylor "in any manner" language supports this
standard and implies that officers should not have a lot of discretion in the
invocation decision. The threshold of clarity standard allows officers to
guess whether the suspect wants an attorney and if she has articulated
clearly enough to require one, which results in "difficult judgment calls."' 53
Many doubt whether officers will value an individual's constitutional rights
if it will frustrate their investigation.5 4 Without the per se standard, officers

there other reasons for treating pregnancy differently?" Id.
147. See id. at 846-47 (explaining that the "method" forces a "decision-maker" to pay
"special attention" to historically overlooked interests and concerns).
148. See State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715, 719 (Fla. 1997).
149. See Ainsworth, supra note 7, at 306.
150. Id. at 306-07.
151" See id. at 307.
152. See id. at 304.
153. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452,474 (1994).
154. See Ainsworth, supra note 7, at 311.
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can manipulate the interrogation process and justify ignoring requests for
counsel and to remain silent.'55 The per se standard better fulfills the desire
for a bright line rule, which prompted later courts to adopt the threshold
standard. Per se invocation is the easiest standard to apply because officers
do not have to determine if the statement meets the required threshold.
Since questioning can continue if officers label a request as equivocal,
threshold of clarity gives police the power to dissuade suspects from
making further attempts to invoke Fifth Amendment protection.' 56 When
officers see a suspect is considering the need for counsel, they can interject
statements suggesting an attorney is unnecessary, obtaining one is not in the
suspect's best interest, and the process of getting an attorney is slow and
difficult. 57 Threshold of clarity defeats Miranda'spurpose of informing
suspects that police will respect their constitutional rights. 5
The threshold of clarity doctrine rewards those who speak in direct,
assertive language-the presumed norm-at the expense of those who do
not conform to that male norm.5 9 Gender bias exists because the "framers
of the majority doctrine never asked the 'woman question,"' and instead
developed a legal standard based on male behavior and experience.16 By
not considering female speech patterns, courts have made it unlikely that
the Edwards rule-preventing police from continuing interrogations until
counsel is present or the suspect initiates relevant conversation-will ever
protect women. 6 ' Only per se invocation provides equal protection for all.

155. See id. at 310-11 (reviewing Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir.) (en bane) cert.
denied,444 U.S. 981 (1979), where the dissent noted that the interrogator used "clarification" to
dissuade the defendant from demanding counsel).
156. See id.
157. See id. at 312.
158. See id. at 297. Examples of requests that have been ignored because officers and courts
labeled them equivocal include: "Wait a minute. Maybe I ought to have an attorney. You guys are
trying to pin a murder rap on me .. .- Id. at 303 (quoting People v. Kreuger, 412 N.E.2d 537,
538 (111. 1980)). "Will you supply [a lawyer] now so that I may ask him should I continue with this
interview at this moment?" Id. at 304 (quoting People v. Santiago, 519 N.Y.S.2d 413, 414-15
(Sup. Ct. 1987), aff'd, 530 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1988)). A suspect asking the police to recommend a
good lawyer and a suspect stating she is sick of being hassled and wants to call a lawyer were also
found to be equivocal. See id. at 304-05.
159. See id. at 315.
160. Id. at 317. Ainsworth questions why the right to counsel in police custodial
interrogations must be affirmatively invoked at all. See id. at 321. She suggests that suspects
should automatically be provided with counsel at the beginning of questioning instead of having
to confront the police. See id. The requirement of asserting the Fifth Amendment right may be
another masculine preference for assertive behavior. See id.
161. See id.at 320.
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